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INSANITY DEFENSE - CRIMINAL
INTENT-DuE PROCESS OF LAW.-
[Mississippi] The defendant was
indicted and -convicted of murder
but was found by the jury to have
been insane at the time of the kill-
ing. The verdict undertook to con-
form to chapter 75 of the Mississippi
Laws of 1928, which provides that
insanity shall not be a defense to
murder, but proof of the insanity
may be offered in mitigation of the
crime, and that the jury, if they
find from the evidence that the de-
fendant was insane at the time of
the commission of the act shall so
certify in their verdict, or if they
cannot agree on whether he was
insane at the time of the verdict
or not they shall so state and in the
latter case the judge shall sentence
the defendant to imprisonment for
the rest of his natural life in the
penitentiary. Held: that the statute
is unconstitutional and void, because
it is in contravention of Section 14,
Mississippi Constitution of 1890,
which ordains that "No person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty except by due process of law":
State v. Sinclair (Miss. 1931) 132
So. 581.
In his opinion Justice Elthridge
stated that as applied to the crime
of murder it has always been neces-
sary to entertain an intent either
expressed or implied. He, then
quoted from Smoot "Insanity" p.
372, "Insanity is considered in the
jurisprudence of all civilized na-
tions to be a defense against pun-
ishment for crime. It is usually set
out among the recognized defenses
in the criminal codes of the sev-
eral states. The reason for allow-
ing it as such a defense is obvious.
One of the essential ingredients of
crime is intent. Intent involves an
exercise of the reasoning powers in
which the result of the criminal act
can be clearly foreseen and clearly
understood . . . So closely has
the idea of insanity as a defense to
crime been woven into the criminal
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jurisprudence of English speaking
countries that it has become a part
of the fundamental laws thereof to
the extent that a statute which at-
tempts to deprive a defendant of the
right to plead it will be declared
unconstitutional and void."
In the statute in the principal case
the. legislature has undertaken to
say that the non-existence of one of
these necessary elements is imma-
terial and though it is absent such
person shall be branded as a felon
for the rest of his natural life.
There could be no greater cruelty
than trying, convicting and punish-
ing a person wholly unable to un-
derstand the nature and consequence
of his act. Such punishment is cer-
tainly cruel and unusual In a con-
stitutional sense. This statute vio-
lates the "due process clause" be-
cause it does not define with cer-
tainty the nature of the prohibited
act and there is not sufficient basis
for its enactment to any purpose of
government that will justify its
passage under this clause. The mere
fact that this defense has been
abused is not sufficient basis. it
is repugnant to the "equal protec-
tion clause" of the constitution as
it is discriminatory and unequal as
agaiinst a sane person as can be seen
by comparing this statute with those
on manslaughter where the homi-
cide is reduced because there is no
specific intent. Under the manslaugh-
ter statutes a person cannot be im-
prisoned for a period longer than
twenty years while under this statute
an insane person can be imprisoned
for life which may be much more
than twenty years. It also violates
that part of the constitution which
guarantees a man a fair and impar-
tial trial. This section contemplates
that a person shall be in a condi-
tion to be able to help in the con-
duct of his trial. He cannot do this
if he is insane, but the statute says
the judge may put him onl trial.
In his concurring opinion Justicc
Griffith stated that it is not neces-
sary to find an express inhibition in
the constitution before a statute can
be declared unconstitutional, but a
great deal can be inferred from the
wordings of the sections. The Laws
of Nature are of a higher authority
than any human enactment and
therefore constitutional laws are in-
separable therefrom. In the light
of nature's laws an insane person is
incapable of committing- a crime.
Diseases which are the work of
nature cannot be punished as a
crime. The legislature cannot
change into guilt or punish as a
crime that which under the supreme
laws of nature are not guilt or
punish as a crime that which nature
says is not a crime. This statute
is void because it is contrary to
the immutable and paramount law
of nature. The field of.operation of
the legislative power upon the dis-
eased is amelioration and segrega-
tion and not condemnation.
In his dissenting opinion Chief
Justice Smith adhered to the. view
that the only test of the validity
of an act regularly passed by a
state legislature is whether or not
it violates the limitations imposed
by the State or Federal Constitu-
tions in express terms or by clear
implication and not for any other
reason. This statute does not ex-
pressly require a defendant to be
tried while insane and should not
be held to do so by implication.
The legislature has the power to
define crime and may determine its
elements. The Constitution recog-
nizes the common law as the law
of the land, but it is subject to be
altered or repealed at the will of
the legislature. In construing the
statute in its relationship to the "due
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process clause" the Chief Justice
said, "If men differ as to the rea-
sonableness of whether a statute
bears a substantial relationship to a
proper purpose of' government the
legislature is entitled to its judgment
and is not to be superseded by the
judgment of the courts." The legis-
lative purpose of this statute is to do
away with the false plea of insanity
and confine a person who has taken
life while insane and may do so
again. The statute does not proi ide
for any cruel or unusual punish-
ment. -The right of the state to
confine insane persons who have
committed dangerous acts and are
a menace to society is not doubted.
The confinement provided for is
neither cruel nor unusual unless made
so by the place and nature of the
imprisonment and continues though
the insanity disappears. There can
be no stigma attached as the ver-
dict of the jury speaks of insanity
and the absence of moral guilt.
They do not have to find the de-
fendant guilty of murder only, but
mayl find him guilty of manslaughter
if in their estimation they feel that
lie is guilty of the lesser offense as
the statute does not state that he
cannot be found guilty of man-
slaughter even though it speaks of
murder. The general Welfare of
the people is of far greater im-
portance than the rights of any one
person.
Considering the propositions raised
in this case it is found that one
who is so insane as to be incapable
of entertaining a criminal intent,
which is one of the essential in-
gredients of a crime, cannot be
guilty of a crime or held criminally
responsible for his act: Singer and
Krohn "Insanity and Law" p. 283;
Parsons v. State (1886) 81 Ala.
577. 2 So. 854; Hopps v. People
(1863) 31 111. 385; People v. Cure-
rins (1882) 47 Mich. 334, 11' N.
W. 184; State v. Brown (1909)
36 Utah 46, 102 Pac. 640; Pritz v.
State (1912) 178 Ind. 463, 99 N.
E. 727; Bishop v. State (1911) 96
Miss. 846, 52 So. 21. Insanity is
a complete defense in all cases and
is not merely a mitigating circum-
stance: People v. Kelley (1908) 7
Cal. A. 554, 95 Pac. 45; Sage v.
State (1883) 91 Ind. 141; Con-
inonwealth v. Wireback (1899) 190
Pa. 138, 42 Atl. 542; Commonwealth
v. Cooper (1914) 219 Mass. 1, L06
N. E. 545; Witty v. State (1914) 75
Tex. Cr. 440, 171 S. W. 229; State
v. Maioni (1909) 78 N. J. L. 339.
Not everything which may pass
under the form of statutory enact-
ment can be considered due process
of law, nor can a state make every-
thing due process of law which by
its own legislature it declares to be
such: Martin v. Dix (1876) 52
Miss. 53; State v. Loomis (1893)
115 Mo. 307, 22 S. W. 350; Bur-
dick v. People (1894) 149 Il1. 600,
36 N. E. 948, 6 R. C. L. 438.
The prohibition of the constitu-
tion in regard to cruel and unusual
punishment applies to punishment
which amounts to physical torture or
to such as would shock the minds
of persons possessed of the ordinary
feelings of humanity: Weems v.
United States (1909) 217 U. S. 349,
30 S. Ct. 544; People v. Elliott
(1916) 272 IIl. 592, 112 N. E. 300;
Hobbs v. State (1892) 133 Ind.
404, 32 N. E. 1019; State v. Becker
(1892) 3 S. Dak. 29, 51 N. W.
1018; Franklin v. Brown (1914) 73
W. Va. 727, 81 S. E. 405.
In the light of the authorities one
cannot help but see the justification
of the viewpoint of the majority,
but there is much to support the
position taken in the dissent. The
insanity defense has been subjected
to a great deal of abuse in its ap-
plication. By this statute the legis-
lature of Mississippi has endeavored
to correct the misuse of this de-
fense, but the majority opinion con-
siders that it is better to allow a few
to escape than to jeopardize the
constitutional rights of many. The
dissenting judge thinks that the
legislature has made a step in the
right direction and should not be
thwarted by the courts. This de-
cision has shown, however, that the
statute will have to be drawn more
carefully if it is to succeed in its
purpose and yct not impair the con-
stitutional rights of the defendant.
ALBERT 0. HOFFMAN.
CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES IN NAXR-
cOTICS AND LIQUOR CAsEs.-rFed-
eral] Government ageants. suspect-
ing the defendant of selling nar-
cotics, sent an addict and profes-
sional informer to try to obtain evi-
dence of his guilt. She made three
different purchases of morphine
from him within the same day-
one of two dollars, one of eight,
and one of ten. He then became
suspicious and would bring her no
more, whereupon he was arrested.
The jury acquitted the defendant
upon a count which involved the
two dollar sale, but convicted him
upon counts involving the other
two sales as not being from an
original stamped package, under 44
stat. 96 (1926); 26 U. S. C. A.
692. It also convicted him upon a
count which charged a sale of
morphine not in pursuance to a
written order of the buyer upon a
blank form issued, for the purpose
by the commissioner of internal
Revenue: 38 Stat. 786 (1914) 26
U. S. C. A. 696. The maximum
penalty, five years imprisonment and
a two thousand dollar fine, was as-
sessed on each of these three
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counts. The main question on ap-
peal was whether these sentences
should run consecutively or concur-
rently. Held: the sentences should
run consecutively, making a total
of fifteen years imprisonment plus
six thousand dollars in fines: Block-
burger v. U. S. (C. C. A. 111. 1931)
50 F. (2nd) 795; affirmed: United
States Supreme Court, January 4,
1932.
Entrapment was not mentioned as
a defense in the opinion, although
Alshuler, I., dissenting in the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, deplored the
fact that the government made its de-
tecting process an installment af-
fair, and that the penalties for each
installment were made to run con-
secutively. There was, however, no
entralplent. 'trictly speaking, in
this case. The defense of entrap-
ment is one that usually excuses
the defendant of all criminal lia-
bility for his wrongful acts:
l1'cidernian v. U. S. (C. C. A. Okla.
1926) 10 F. (2nd) 745. To catch
a suspect by a trap or by deceit
does not alone constitute entrap-
ment: U. S. v. lVray (D. C. Ga.
1925) 8 F. (2nd) 429. This de-
fense is usually open to an other-
wise innocent person who has been
induced to commit a crime with a
view to having him prosecuted.
Thus one who had no intention of
committing a crime, but was lured
into crime by officers of the law
cannot be convicted: WVeidcrman
v. U. S., supra. But if the intent
and purpose to violate the law were
present, the mere fact that public
officers furnished the opportunity is
no defense: Rittcr v. U. S. (C. C.
A. Nev. 1924) 2 F. (2nd) 598.
Thus the mere fact that officers offer
to buy liquor, either in person or
through agents does not constitute
entrapment where they have rea-
sonable cause to believe that the
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defendant is violating the law: St.
Clair v. U. S. (C. C. A. Neb. 1927)
17 F. (2nd) 886; Jordan v. U. S.
(C. C. A. Ga. 1924) 2 F. (2nd)
598; Kendjerski v. U. S. (C. C. A.
Ohio 1926) 9 F. (2nd) 909; De
Long v. U. S. (C. C. A. Neb. 1925)
4 F. (2nd) 244; Farley v. U. S.
(C. C. A. Wash. 1921) 269 F. 721;
Ramsey v. U. S. (C. C. A. Tenn.
1920) 268 F. 825; Sancedo v. U. S.
(C. C. A. Texas 1920) 268 F. 830.
There is something more to this
case, however, than the mere solic-
itation to commit a crime. Here
the defendant was induced to com-
mit not one but three acts. Of
course, the fact that a single sale
of morphine can be an offense un-
der two different statutes is none
of the officer's doing, but the fact
that each time he or his agent
makes a purchase from the defend-
ant may add five years and two
thousand dollars to the defendant's
penalty gives him a tremendous
power. Suppose that the defendant
in the present case had not become
suspicious, and that the govern-
ment did not arrest him until after
it had made twenty purchases, would
the penalty have been one hundred
years plus a fine of forty thousand
dollars? Such a decision is pos-
sible. 'Under the federal law the
offenses which may be joined in the
same action are not limited to the
consolidation of counts- whicn might
have been joined at common law,
but the trial court is vested with
discretion to refuse to permit
joinder if it would prevent a fair
trial or be unjust to the defendant:
10 Stat. 162 (18 U. S. C. A. 557)
Dolan v. U. S. (C. C. A. Mo. 1904)
133 F. 440; Kidwdl v. U. S. (1912)
38 App. D. C. 566.
Indictments usually contain many
counts, but courts do not often
sentence the offender on each count
of which" he is found guilty. What
formula guides the'courts in exer-
cising this discretionary power?
"If there be several counts, but they
appear to charge the same offense,
variously stated to prevent variance
from the evidence, there will be but
one sentence; but if the counts
really charge separate offenses,
though connected together, and
therefore capable of joinder under
this section, sentence may be im-
posed for both, for such was the
legislative intent in creating sep-
arate offenses": Ex Parte Farlow
(D. C. Ga. 1921) 272 F. 910; and
see Ex Parte Hibbs (D. C. Ore.
1886) 26 F. 421. These words, as
can readily be seen, are to be used
more often in expressing judgment
than in determining it. For in-
stance, in the present case, the court
could just as easily have held that
the two counts for the two sales
charged the same continuing offense
stated in two different counts in or-
der to prevent variance from the
evidence.
It is to be noted that this case is
in line with the present trend of
stiff penalties handed down in nar-
cotics cases: Cf. Parmagini v.
United States (C. C. A. Cal. 1930)
42 F. (2nd) 721, where the de-
fendant amassed five consecutive
sentences aggregating seventeen
years in the penitentiary plus $17,-
U00 in fines by reason of his viola-
tion of five different statutes by a
single sale of narcotics; accord
Robinson v. United States (C. C.
A. Cal. 1923) 288 F. 450 (Purchase,
sale, and distribution of narcotics
held distinct offenses) ; Proffitt v.
United States (C. C. A. Cal. 1920)
264 F. 299 (indictment containing
separate counts for receiving and
concealing opium held sufficient);
lponnatsu Ukichi v. Unitcd States
(C. C. A. Hawaii 1922) 281 F.
904
525 (conspiracy to sell and conceal
narcotic drug held separate offense,
punishable as such). But see
Braden v. United States (C. C. A.
Minn. 1920) 270 F. 441, where it
was held in the eighth circuit that
possession of five separate narcotics
constituted but one offense. De-
cisions following the Parmagini
case are held not to impose double
jeopardy since it is competent for
legislation to make out of one trans-
action any number of separate
crimes: see I Bishop "Criminal
Law" (9th Ed. 1925) sec. 1060;
Carter v. McClaughry (1901) 183
U. S. 365, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 181;
Morgan v. Devine (1915) 237 U. S.
632, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 712.
That similar sentences are pos-
sible in liquor cases is shown by
People v. Franklin (1930) 341 Ill.
499, 173 N. E. 607. There, in spite
of the general lack of esteem in
which the Eighteenth Amendment
is held in most parts of Illinois, the
court decided that eleven different
sales to several stool-pigeons justi-
fied eleven different consecutive
sentences of sixty days each plus
eleven fines of $150 each. In spite
of the seemingly severe penalty im-
posed in this case, there is still a
great difference between its less than
two years penalty and the fifteen
years provided by the instant case.
Moreover, People v. Franklin is
conspicuous for its severity in con-
trast with the general leniency of
decisions under the prohibition laws.
On the other side of the fence is
Orsatti v. United States (C. C. A.
Cal. 1924) 3 F. (2nd) 778; cer-
tiorari denied 268 U. S. 694, 45 S.
Ct. 513. There the defendant was
found guilty under twenty-one
counts for twenty-one payments of
graft to a prohibition officer, but
only one sentence was imposed.
Where the defendant was convicted
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on two counts, (1) transporting
144 bottles of whiskey, and (2)
possession of the same whiskey.
and he was sentenced to a $350
fine on each count, the alternative
sentences of forty days on each count
were made to run concurrently when
the defendant was unable to pay
his fine: State v. Melerine (1925)
188 La. 511, 104 *So. 308. In a
similar case, (1) possession and (2)
selling of the same pint of whiskey
did not constitute separate offenses:
Muncy v. U. S. (C. C. A. W. Va.
1923) 289 F. 780. It was also held
erroneous to impose sentence both
on a count for possession and on one
for transportation of liquor: Schroe-
der v. U. S. (C. C. A., N. Y. 1925)
7 F. (2nd) 60.
Sentences given to violators of
the liquor laws in St. Louis, as re-
vealed by the Missouri Crime Sur-
vey, are interesting. "From that
study it appears that in 1925 but
6.44 per cent of the liquor mis-
demeanor cases ended in carrying
out of a sentence and but 3.88 per
cent in carrying out of the sentence
unmodified; and that in 1926 the
percentage of sentences carried out
was but 4.47. In the latter year,
of 670 prosecutions, in which 476
defendants pleaded guilty and ten
were convicted on trial, but 30 sen-
tences were carried out. In 93 per
cent of the cases in which a fine
was imposed the fine was 'stayed,'
and in 2.67 per cent it was reduced.
Thus in substantially 96 per cent
of the cases of convictions result-
ing in a fine there was no penalty
or no substantial penalty. In any
event an insignificant total of four
out of 487 who pleaded guilty or
were convicted on trial were im-
prisoned, and no term exceeded 60
days. The prohibition survey shows
that in 1929 conditions were no bet-
ter": House Document No. 722,
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71st Congress, 3rd session, p. 42
(1931), "Wickersham Report."
"When the enforcement of the
National Prohibition Act is compared
with the enforcement of the laws
as to narcotics . . . there is an
enormous margin of profit in break-
ing the latter. The means of de-
tecting transportation are more eas-
ily evaded than in the case of
liquor. Yet there are no difficulties
in the case of narcotics beyond
those involved in the nature of the
traffic because the laws against
them are supported everywhere by
a general and determined public
sentiment": "Wickersham Report,"
op. cit. p. 80.
What are the factors motivating
-the dissimilar judgments in these
two types of cases? Is it the gen-
eral attitude of judges that the nar-
cotic laws do not punish with ap-
propriate severity the reprehensible
business of "bootlegging dope"? At
any rate, many of the judges woull
seem to share the opinion of many
of the laymen that the narcotic laws
were more rightly conceived than
the prohibition laws. Because of
the overwhelming amount of
liquor litigation, much of the laxity
in the enforcement of the prohibi-
tion laws can also be attributed to
the administrative factor. The per-
sonalities of different judges as
shown by the divergence of their
reactions to similar situations is an
interesting factor. A survey was
made of the disposition of thou-
sands of minor criminal cases by
several judges of the City Magis-
trate Court in New York during
the years 1914 to 1916 with the pur-
pose of finding to what extent the
personal equation entered into the
administration of justice. They
differed to an amazing degree in
their treatment of similar classes of
cases. Thus of 546 persons charged
with intoxication brought before
one judge, he found about 97 per
cent guilty, whereas of the 673 ar-
raigned before another judge, 531,
or 79 per cent were found not
guilty: Everson, "The Human Ele-
ment in Justice," 10 JOUR. OF CRIM.
LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY 90 (1920).
It would be very difficult, if not
impossible, to avoid the exercise of
the judge's discretion to determine
what counts should be joined and
whether the sentences upon a join-
der of counts should run concur-
rently or consecutively. Criminal
law involves the most insistent and
the most fundamental of social in-
terests. It is true that "No legis-
lative omniscience can predict and
appoint consequences for the infinite
variety of detailed facts which hu-
man conduct continually presents":
Roscoe Pound, "Criminal Justice in
America" (1930) 36. Just as it is
a scientific truth that no two peas
in a pod were ever exactly alike,
so is it true that no two human
beings are ever exactly alike, nor
will the impartial application of a
law have the same effect on every-
one. The judicial discretion, if
wisely used, can be a greater equal-
izing agency in justice than any
law. It is submitted that aside from
the impossibility of avoiding the ex-
ercise of the judicial discretion,
there is no desirability of doing so.
EMERSON WHITNEY.
EXPRESSION OF OPINION BY PROSE-
CUTING ATTORNEY AS TO GUILT OF
AccusED.-[Pennsylvania] The de-
fendant was indicted for murder.
Three witnesses gave testimony to
the effect that the killing was com-
mitted by the accused in self-de-
fense. The prosecuting attorney, in
his argument to the jury, repeated-
ly stated that in his belief the de-
fense was "cooked up." The de-
fendant's counsel objected to this
language, asking for the withdrawal
of a juror and continuance of the
case. These requests were denied.
The court also refused to instruct
the jury upon the request of the
defense that the prosecuting at-
torney's statements should be dis-
regarded. On appeal it was held
that there was "no error": Con-
nonwealth v. Massarelli (Pa. 1931)
156 Atl. 101.
The majority of the court held
that a prosecuting attorney may ex-
press his opinion on the evidence
but should avoid stating his per-
sonal belief. A different view
was taken by the dissenting judge
who argued there was error in that
no evidence was submitted by the
prosecutor to show that the defense
was "cooked up"; that the judge's
refusal to give instructions to dis-
regard the district attorney's state-
ments gave judicial sanction to the
remarks; and that in essence the
expression of the attorney's belief
that the defense was a fabrication
was equivalent to expressing his be-
lief in the guilt of the accused.
The principle has become estab-
lished that a prosecuting attorney
may declare that in his opinion the
accused is guilty where he states,
or it is apparent, that such opinion
-is founded on the evidence: Fertig
v. State (1898) 100 Wis. 301, 75
N. W. 960; State v. Armstrong
(1905) 37 Wash. 51, 79 Pac. 490;
People v. Hess (1891) 85 Mich.
128, 48 N. W. 181; Crenshaw v.
State (1908) 153 Ala. 5, 45 So. 631;
Valentine v. State (1913) 108 Ark.
594, 159 S. W. 26; People v. Rog-
ers (1912) 163 Cal. 476, 126 Pac.
143; Riggins v. State (1915) 125
Md. 165, 93 AtI. 437; Reed v. State
(1902) 66 Neb. 184, 92 N. W. 321;
People v. Pargone (1927) 327 Ill.
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463, 158 N. E. 716; State v. Horton
(1922) 151 La. 683, 92 So. 298;
People v. Dykes (Cal. App. 1930)
290 Pac. 102. On the other hand,
it has been held that a prosecuting
attorney should not in his argument
to the jury declare his individual
opinion or belief that the accused is
guilty, where the jury may get the
impression that the opinion or be-
lief is based on something other
than the evidence submitted: Broz-
hack v. State (1899) 109 Ga. 514,
35 S. E. 123; Jackson v. State
(1889) 116 Ind. 464, 19 N. E. 330;
Howard v. Commonwealth (1901)
110 Ky. 356, 61 S. W. 756; State
v. Iverson (1915) 136 La. 982, 68
So. 98; People v. Dane (1886) 59
Mich. 550, 26 N. W. 781; State v.
Clark (1911) 114 Minn. 342, 131
N. W. 369; People v. King (1916)
276 Ill. 138, 114 N. E. 601; State v.
Hance (Mo. App. 1923) 256 S. W.
534. Various reasons have been
given as a basis for this rule, one
view being that such a statement
makes the prosecuting attorney a
witness without the opportunity of
being cross-examined: People v.
King, supra. Another view is that
such a declaration is a breach of
professional propriety and profes-
sional ethics: State v. Gunderson
(1913) 26 N. D. 294, 144 N. W.
659. It has been reasoned also that
an attorney has !no authority to
substitute himself for the jury and
pronounce guilt upon the accused:
Cline v. State (1925) 20 Ala. App.
578, 104 So. 347. Whether or not,
however, the appellate court will
reverse and remand a case because
of this improper conduct depends
mainly upon the closeness of the
evidence. In a case where the
guilt was clearly established by two
eye-witnesses and convincing cor-
roborating evidence, it was said
"there is no serious contention that
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plaintiff in error did not commit
the assault that resulted in the
death, and so we hold that the mis-
conduct of the prosecuting attorney
was not reversible error": People
v. Pilewski (1920) 295 Ill. 58, 128
N. E. 801. But where the evidence
is about equally balanced, such con-
duct on the part of the prosecutor
may be reversible error. In State
v. Gunderson, supra, a conviction
for rape was reversed and remanded,
the judge saying "in a close case
such as this, the slightest error may
be fraught with the most injurious
of consequences, and we believe that
justice requires that a new trial be
had." Some courts have held that
an instruction given to disregard
counsel's statements would take
away the effect of prejudice which
may have been caused by such re-
marks: State v. Harper (1918)
143 La. 534, 78 So. 845; State v.
Egan (1923) 47 S. D. 1, 195 N. W.
642; Johnson v. State (1920) 150
Ga, 67, 102 S. E. 439; State v.
Smith (Mo. 1926) 281 S. W. 35.
However, it is apparent that where
the evidence is close, such an in-
struction may have no effect.
In the instant case, the evidence
was not clear whether the deceased
or the accused commenced the fir-
ing. From the circumstances it
was more than likely that the de-
ceased was the aggressor since the
defendant, by paying his attentions
to the other's wife, had caused a
disruption of the marriage, there
being at the time of the killing a
bill pending for divorce. Thus
there was a possibility that defend-
ant shot in self-defense, but the
prosecutor's statements undoubtedly
lessened the weight of the testimony
of the defendant's witnesses who
testified that they saw the deceased
fire first. The test is: Were the
remarks made as deductions from
the evidence already introduced in
the case? The answer in this in-
stance must be in the negative. The
case being one where the jury could
decide one way or the other, it
seems that the lower court should
have allowed the withdrawal of the
juror and continuance of the case.
It could have lessened the effect of
the improper statements, if they
were erroneous, by giving an in-
struction to disregard them, but the
trial court also refused to do that.
These denials probably were pre-
judicial to the defendant and seem




ICE FROM PROOF OF THE KILLING-
BURDEN OF PROOF IN REBUTTAL.-
[New Jersey] The defendant was
indicted and convicted for the sec-
ond degree murder of his wife. His
testimony disclosed that he had
taken his wife's revolver after she
threatened to shoot him but in the
struggle it was discharged, the bul-
let entering her head, which resulted
in her death, as he discovered on
his return from market. Excepting
the conditions under which the
struggle occurred, his story was
contradicted in all its material par-
ticulars by witnesses for the prose-
cution. For reversal, the defend-
ant urged that the jury's verdict was
against the weight of the evidence,
as he claimed that the revolver was
discharged accidentally and wholly
unintentionally, although he did not
deny firing the shot. Held: on writ
of error, that the judgment should
be affirmed, since no reversible error
appeared on the record. "Where
the fact of killing is first proved,
the law presumes it to have been
founded on malice until the con-
trary appears and all circumstances
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alleged by way of justification, ex-
cuse, or alleviation must be proved
by the prisoner, unless they arise
out of the evidence produced against
him": State v. Mangino (New Jer-
sey 1931) 156 Atl. 430.
The usual presumption in homi-
cide cases is that the accused is in-
nocent until proved to be guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt by the
prosecution, thus placing the bur-
den on the state to prove all the ele-
ments of the crime, malice being
one of these elements. If malice is
to be presumed, the prosecution is
relieved to a considerable extent of
the necessity of producing evidence.
Most jurisdictions support the hold-
ing in the principal case: Coin-
7nonwealth v. Troup (1931) 302
Pa. 246, 153 Atl. 337; Patty v. State
(1921) 126 Miss. 94, 88 So. 498;
Commonwealth v. Bedrosian (1924)
247 Mass. 573, 142 N. E. 778; State
v. Duncan (1918) 101 Wash. 542,
172 Pac. 915; People v. Schryver
(1870) 42 N. Y. 1; State v. Holland
(1927) 193 N. C. 713, 138 S. E. 8;
Patton v. Comnwnwealth (1930)
235 Ky. 845, 32 S. W. (2d) 405.
The decisions in New Jersey have
uniformly upheld the doctrine:
State v. Zellers (1824) 7 N. J. L.
220; Brown v. State (1899) 62 N.
J. L. 666, 42 Atl. 811; State v.
Ehlers (1922) 98 N. J. L. 236, 119
Atl. 15. This principle only re-
quires that the defendant introduce
sufficient evidence of the defense as
to raise a reasonable doubt in the
minds of the jury on the question
of malice; thereupon, the prosecu-
tion once more has the burden of
proving express malice beyond a
reasonable doubt: Comment (1931)
21 JouR. CRIM. LAW & CRIMIN-
OLOGY 609, 610. The burden of thus
going forward with the evidence is
not imposed on the defendant when
the mitigating circumstances appear
from the proof of the prosecution:
State v. Patterson (1873) 45 Vt.
308; People v. Russell (1926) 322
II. 295, 153 N. E. 389; Wagner v.
State (Ark. 1931) 37 S. W. (2d)
86.
In Illinois, section 155 of the
Criminal Code provides that when
the killing is proved, the burden of
proving circumstances of mitiga-
tion, justification or excuse devolves
on the accused unless the proof of
the prosecution sufficiently mani-
fests that the crime committed only
amounts to manslaughter or that
the accused was justified or excused
in committing the homicide: • Ill.
Rev. Stat. (Cahill 1931) chap. 38,
sec. 352. An instruction in the
words of this section has been ap-
proved: Duncan v. People (1890)
134 IIl. 110, 24 N. E. 765. The
principle was recognized in People
v. Hubert (1911) 251 IIl. 514, 96
N. E. 294, and People v. Dare
(1919) 288 Ill. 182, 123 N. E. 321.
Such an instruction was disap-
proved in People v. Willy (1922)
301 Ill. 307, 133 N. E. 859. Here,
the prosecution's proof tended to
show that the act had been done in
self-defense so that the burden was
still on the prosecution to show be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the
act was criminal. Relying on this
case, it has been said that the bur-
den of proof never shifts to the de-
fendant, no matter what his de-
fense may be and that section 155
of the Criminal Code should not be
given as an instruction in any homi-
cide case: People v. Durand
(1923) 307 IIl. 611, 139 N. E. 78;
accord: People v. Sterankovitch
(1924) 313 Ill. 556, 145 N. E. 172;
Bishop "Criminal Procedure" (2d
ed. 1913) vol. II, secs. 1049, 1050;
Taylor v. State (1929) 201 Ind.
241, 167 N. E. 133; Landreth v.
State (1930) 201 Ind. 691, 171 N.
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E. 192; Lee v. State (Ala. App.
1931) 132 Sou. 61; State v. Twine
(Ia. 1931) 233 N. W. 476 (self-
defense). Yet, we find two later
Illinois cases approving the prin-
ciple represented in the statute al-
though the question of the correct-
ness of such an instruction was not
involved: People v. Russell (1926)
322 Ill. 295, 153 N. E. 389; People
v. Meyer (1928) 331 Ill. 608, 163
N. E. 453.
Where the defense is insanity,
some jurisdictions hold that the
state has the burden of proving the
defendant sane beyond a reasonable
doubt: Davis v. U. S. (1895) 160
U. S. 469, 16 Sup. Ct. 353; Walker
v. People (1882) 88 N. Y. 81; Peo-
ple v. Cochran (1924) 313 Ill. 508,
145 N. E. 207. Others put the bur-
den on the defendant to prove
insanity by a preponderance of
the evidence: Graves v. State
(1883) 45 N. J. L. 347; Keener v.
State (1895) 97 Ga. 388, 24 S. E.
28; Comment (1926) 4 Tex. Law
Rev. 533.
Allowing a presumption of malice
to arise after proof of the killing
has been established would appear
to put too great a risk of non-per-
suasion on the defendant. In ad-
dition, it may be said that a pre-
sumption of malice gives the ap-
pearance of conflicting with the pre-
sumption of innocence which re-
quires the prosecution to assume the
burden of proof by showing guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. How-
ever, it is believed that the prin-
ciple affords a convenient method
for punishing those persons whom
the court might believe to be guilty,
leaving a loop-hole on the question
of the burden of proof through
which the court can escape when
the guilt is not so clear. This may
account for the inconsistency of the
Illinois decisions where apparently
no valid reason is furnished why
an instruction in the words of the
statute should not be given. In this
situation, it would not be wise to
make use of the advice which has
been offered that when stock in-
structions are not available, the
words of the statute should be fol-
lowed: Swanson "Instructions to
Juries," p. 2.
J. F. WATERMAN.
POLICE POWER-FREED0 OF THE
PREss.-[United States] The ap-
pellant was permanently enjoined
under a statute which provided
that any person who shall be en-
gaged in the "business of regularly
or customarily producing, publish-
ing or circulating, having in pos-
session, selling or giving away a
malicious, scandalous 'and defam-
atory newspaper, magazine or other
periodical" is guilty of a nuisance
and may be enjoined; Laws of
Minnesota, 1925, ch. 285; Minne-
sota Statutes (Mason, 1927) sec.
10123-1 et seq. In an intermediate
appeal [State Ex Rel Olson v.
Guilford (1928) 174 Minn. 457, 219
N. W. 770, 58 A. L. R. 607] and an
appeal from the judgment of the
District Court [State Ex Rel Olson
v. Guilford (1929) 179 Minn. 40,
227 N. W. 326], the Supreme Court
of Minnesota held the law constitu-
tional as against the objection that
it violated both the State and Fed-
eral Constitutions: Held: On ap-
peal (four Justices dissenting)
judgment reversed; that the statute
infringed the liberty of the press
guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment: Near v. State of
Minnesota (1931) 51 S. Ct. 625.
The First Amendment to the Fed-
eral Constitution expressly protects
the freedom of the press from in-
fringement by the Federal Govern-
ment and similar provisions of State
Constitutions protect from infringe-
ment by State- governments. The
Fourteenth Amendment to the Fed-
eral Constitution has been con-
strued to include freedom of the
press in the liberties protected by
the due process clause: Gitlow v.
New York (1925) 268 U. S. 357,
45 S. Ct. 625; Whitney v. California
(1927) 274 U. S. 357, 47 S. Ct. 641:
Stromberg v. California (1931)
283 U. S. 359, 51 S. Ct. 532.
The majority opinion held that
the statute by a deprivation of lib-
erty violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment by imposing a previous re-
straint on publication (any suppres-
sion of or interference with the
publication or circulation of a
newspaper, magazine, etc.) and that
the statute was beyond the police
powers of the state. The dissent
maintained that there was no previ-
ous restraint on publication, be-
cause the statute did not provide
for administrative restraint but for
a remedy, i. e., a suit in equity.
They also maintained that the ap-
pellant abused his right to freedom
of the press and that it was within
the police power of the state to de-
nounce the things done as a nui-
sance since he was threatening the
morals, peace, and good order of the
state.
There seem to be no cases which
uphold the dissent in their view
that the statute was not a previous
restraint on publication. On the
other hand courts in practically
every jurisdiction have denounced
similar practices as the imposing of
previous restraints, Dearborn Pub-
lishing Company v. Fitzgerald
(1921) 271 Fed. 479 (D. C. N. D.
Ohio, E. D.) (attempt to prevent
sale of newspapers on city streets
on ground that they calculated to
excite scandal and had the tendency
to create breaches of the peace);
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.Very Yorker Slaals--citnng v. Nolan
(1918) 89 N. J. Eq. 387, 105 Atl.
72 (attempt to suppress newspaper
printed in German as likely to cre-
ate public disturbances). Appar-
ently in only one other instance has
there been an attempt to suppress
a newspaper as a nuisance. A city
ordinance declaring a newspaper a
nuisance and prohibiting its circu-
lation within the city was held void
as curtailing the liberty of the
press, E.r Parte Neill (1893) 32
Tex. Cr. 275, 22 S. W. 923, 40 A.
S. R. 776.
The real question involved is this
-Can publication of a newspaper
be prevented by any procedure with-
out violating the freedom of the
press? All the cases seem to point
in one direction, that is. that a
newspaper may publish what it
pleases without previous restraint
of any kind. In Er Parte Neill,
supra, the court said, "The power
to prohibit the publication of news-
papers is not within the compass
of legislative action in this state,
and any law enacted for that pur-
pose would clearly he in deroga-
tion of the bill of rights." Other
cases which have held that pre-
vious restraints may not be im-
posed are: German Herold Pub.
Co. of New York City, Inc. v.
Brush (1918) 170 N. Y. S. 993;
Ulster Square Dealer v. Fowler
(1908) 58 Misc. 325, 111 N. Y. S.
16; Commonwcealth v. Blanding
(1825) 3 Pick. (Mass.) 304, 15 Am.
Dec. 214; State v. Butterworth
(1928) 104 N. J. L. 579, 142 Atd. 57.
In deciding whether the statute
was an unconstitutional exercise of
the police power or not, the dissent
used the rule that the court is re-
quired to assume that a situation ex-
ists warranting the legislation un-
less the contrary is shown to be
true. While cases were cited up-
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holding this contention it seems that
a much broader rule i prevails, that
is, that the constitution is supreme
and the court in looking for a vio-
lation will go behind the declared
intention of a statute to establish
its real nature and effect: Freund,
"Police Power," pp. 60, 61; Loch,-
ner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 25
S. Ct. 539, Coppage v. Kansas, 236
U. S. 1, 35 S. Ct. 240.
The statute in the instant case
seems to have bden an unreasonable
exercise of the police power.
Though a lawful business may some-
times be regulated under the police
power it cannot be suppressed:
Freund, "Police Power," pp. 531,
537; State v. Houghton (1916)
134 Minn. 226, 158 N. W. 1017;
Pacific States Supply Co. v. San
Francisco, 171 Fed. 727 (C. C. N.
D. Cal. 1909); Chicago v. Chicago
& 0. P. Elev. R. R. Co. (1911) 250
Ill. 486, 95 N. E. 456 Justice But-
ler, who wrote the dissent in the
instant case, in Burns Baking Co v.
Ryan (1924) 264 U. S. 504, said:
"A state may not, under the guise
of protecting the public, arbitrarily
interfere with private business, or
prohibit lawful occupations, or im-
pose unreasonable and unnecessary
restrictions on them." See also
Frost v. Railroad Commission
(1926) 271 U. S. 583; Terrance v.
Thompson (1923) 263 U. S. 197;
Baker v. Daly (D. C. Oregon 1926)
15 F. (2d) 881. A legislature may
not impose unusual restrictions on
lawful occupations by invoking the
doctrine of nuisance: Lawton v.
Steele (1894) 152 U. S. 133, 14 S.
Ct. 499, 38 L. Ed. 385; Williams v.
Evans (1917) 139 Minn. 32, 165
N. W. 495, 166 N. W. 504, L. R. A.
1918F, 542; Freund "Police Power,"
p. 160. The Minnesota statute de-
clared publishing defamatory matter
a nuisance but defamation and
nuisance are clearly distinguishable:
Hall et. ux. v. Cailoway et. al.
(1913) 76 Wash. 42, 135 Pac. 478.
A mere declaration that a thing is
a nuisance does not make it so un-
less in fact it had that character:
Yates v. Milwaukee (1870) 10
Wall. (77 U. S.) 497.
When the vast history of free-
dom of the press is considered and
when one realizes the protections
with which it has been hedged it is
readily seen why the court in this
case declared the statute void.
There-are other remedies available
for abuse of freedom of the press
(criminal libel and private rem-
edies for slander and defamation)
and there is therefore little reason
for enjoining publication of a
newspaper for defamation. To per-
mit it under any guise might be a
dangerous precedent which would
serve as a weapon by which a po-
litical party in power could stifle
criticism of itself and of its con-
duct of government.
JAmES A. HARRINGTON.
